

The Later Mataram Period: History, Succession, and Legitimation In the Land of Kings, 1613-1790

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The Mataram dynasty was the last great pre-colonial power to rule in Central and East Java. Originating in the late 16th century from the twilight years of the Islamic state of Demak, Mataram was based on the Kedu plain—the site of the modern cities of Yogyakarta and Surakarta. At the zenith of its power under Sultan Agung (r. 1613-1645), the dynasty exercised considerable influence over nearly all of Java, and had tributary relations with ports as far as Sumatra and Kalimantan. However, for various reasons Mataram's influence gradually declined after the death of Sultan Agung, until in the mid-eighteenth century Mataram fractured into the independent principalities of Yogyakarta, Surakarta, and the Mangkunegaran.¹

Part one of this paper will review the history of Mataram to the late eighteenth century, summarizing the events precipitating its division by the Treaty of Giyanti in 1755, as well as the major tests of partition in the following four decades. The paper will then address two issues arising from this framework. The first concerns the attitude of the Dutch VOC toward royal succession vis-à-vis the Javanese norm. The second issue highlights Javanese approaches to legitimation in the years following the 1755 partition.

Historical Background²

Early Mataram history is marked by a long series of expansionist campaigns against the eastern coastal states, particularly Surabaya and Demak. In the first half of the 17th century, Agung (r. 1613-1645), one the greatest Javanese historical figures, consolidated Mataram's power. After conquering Madura he took the royal title *Susuhunan*,

¹In the early nineteenth century yet another principality, the Pakualaman, emerged from dissident elements in the Yogyakarta court.

²Unless otherwise noted, Ricklefs 1974 and 1981 are the principal narrative sources for this summary.

associated with the nine *walis*—the semi-legendary Muslim proselytizers of fifteenth- and sixteenth-century Java (Ricklefs 1974:17). He defeated Surabaya and Sunan Giri (a focal point for opposition to Mataram) and in 1636 he solicited the title of *Sultan* from Mecca. However, following Sultan Agung's death in 1645, Mataram entered a long period of decline characterized by economic depression, isolation, rebellion, and court intrigue. Agung's son and successor, Amangkurat I (r. 1646-1647), was a tyrannical and violent ruler, who only succeeded in alienating the Javanese notables through his mass executions and attempts to gain tight administrative control of the kingdom. With the aid of the Dutch VOC, the Crown Prince deposed his father and succeeded him as Amangkurat II (r. 1677-1703). Heavily indebted, Amangkurat II ceded the northern coastal ports (pasisir) to the VOC, further hastening Mataram's inward-turning process. In 1680 he established a new kraton at Kartasura, inaugurating the final phase of Mataram history. The next century saw a series of dynastic struggles in which the VOC, hoping to maintain a profitable stability in the region, became increasingly involved in the internal affairs of Mataram.

As more and more of his enemies were eliminated, the Susuhunan began to feel more secure in his new palace. He soon lost his deference for the VOC and refused to make good on his debts and concessions. The VOC were at this time embroiled in their own internal corruption and economic problems. But when in 1684 it became known that Surapati, an escaped Balinese slave and a major VOC enemy, was being harbored at the Mataram court, Captain François Tack was sent to retrieve Surapati and re-negotiate Amangkurat II's debt. Upon the arrival of the VOC contingent at Kartasura, Amangkurat II and Surapati staged an elaborate assault on Tack, making it appear that the Susuhunan was innocent of any aggression. Tack and his men were killed and the existing VOC garrison exiled. Surapati fled eastward, building up an independent domain that was later to exercise considerable influence over the Eastern Salient.

Around the turn of the 18th century, several factions were gaining power within the Kartasura court, their influence rivaling that of the Susuhunan. One faction was led by Pangéran Puger, the other by the crown prince. In 1702 Amangkurat II asked the VOC for

help in putting down these rival groups but was refused. A year later the Susuhunan died and was succeeded by the crown prince as Amangkurat III. For a time tension in the court eased, but Pangéran Puger fled to Semarang and was soon able to convince the VOC of both his friendship and his legitimacy. In 1704, they formally recognized Pangéran Puger as Susuhunan Pakubuwana I, and the First Javanese War of Succession began.

The coastal regions had little interest in siding with Pakubuwana I, but eventually joined him under duress from the VOC. In 1705 the combined Javanese and VOC forces marched on the Kartasura kraton. Amangkurat III fled east to Surapati, carrying the royal *pusaka* with him to Pasuruhan. After heavy losses on all sides, Pakubuwana I and the VOC crushed the East Javanese forces, killing Surapati and exiling the deposed Susuhunan to Ceylon. The *pusaka* were never entirely recovered. Pakubuwana I signed a new agreement with the VOC, making major concessions in return for the cancellation of Mataram's accumulated debt. The Susuhunan seems to have done his best to keep up with his payments, but the strain on the population was great. By imposing heavy burdens the VOC (suffering losses throughout its Asian offices) merely increased the likelihood of rebellion.

The first state to turn against Mataram was Surabaya in 1717, whose ruler Jangrana II had been murdered at the Susuhunan's court eight years before, alienating his successors. The rebellion soon spread to Panaraga, Madiun, Magetan, and Jagaraga. Meanwhile, in 1719 Pakubuwana I died and was succeeded by his son as Amangkurat IV. The beginning of the Second Javanese War of Succession (1719-1723) saw the new Susuhunan fending off assaults from both his brothers Pangéran Blitar and Purbaya and his uncle Pangéran Arya Mataram only with the aid of the VOC. The displaced Mataram rebels moved eastward, coalescing gradually with Surabayan and other forces. Intense fighting raged for several years, but in the end the VOC crushed the rebel forces decisively in 1723. The cost of the war was added to the royal debt.

Amangkurat IV met an early death in 1726, probably poisoned by persons loyal to the crown prince. His son, at sixteen years of age, succeeded the throne as Susuhunan Pakubuwana II. The new king continued to pay off Mataram's enormous debt to the

VOC, but court intrigue was again growing, threatening the tenuous stability of the kingdom.

In his early years, Pakubuwana II was dominated by the influence of his mother Ratu Amangkurat and the *patih* Danuréja, who had been chief minister since 1709. Ratu Amangkurat favored amicable relations with the Dutch, while Danuréja was opposed to their presence in Java. Danuréja's power grew rapidly, but his influence was threatened by the Susuhunan's charismatic brother Pangéran Arya Mangkunegara. Danuréja contrived to have Mangkunegara accused of a liaison with one of the king's wives, and the offended Susuhunan had the VOC exile his brother to Ceylon and then to the Cape of Good Hope. The Dutch did not believe the charges against Mangkunegara, but they feared that if he remained at court he would soon rebel and others would likely join him. The VOC were also increasingly suspicious of Danuréja, whose anti-European sentiments they were aware of and whom they suspected of ties with the descendants of the hated rebel Surapati.

Tensions at court continued to mount until in 1732 Pakubuwana II, much out of character, suddenly took charge. Upon the Susuhunan's request the VOC happily exiled Danuréja, and a new repayment treaty was negotiated. The Dutch were pleased, feeling they had a stable, malleable ruler at their disposal. For his part, Pakubuwana II did a remarkable job keeping up with his payments. However, it was generally not he who had to bear the economic brunt of these measures but rather the *wong cilik*, or "little man". During this period there were massive population migrations and a dramatic increase in banditry. Meanwhile, the removal of Danuréja did little to curb the influence of anti-VOC elements at court. Furthermore, some local rulers, such as Cakraningrat IV of Madura, were openly resisting Mataram vassalage by 1738. Pakubuwana II soon found himself in a precarious position: could he maintain peaceful relations with the Dutch and still avoid blame for the hardships they imposed?

In 1740, violence erupted in Batavia and soon spread across Java. In this city, dislike and suspicion of the Chinese immigrant population had been growing for many years. The VOC generally admired their industriousness, but a loose immigration policy had put

considerable strain on the local economy. Some Chinese families prospered, arousing jealousy among their neighbors, while many new arrivals faced with unemployment turned to robbery as a means of survival. Tensions came to a head when it was rumored that the VOC was planning to deport many new immigrants, carrying them out to sea and dumping them overboard once over the horizon. Unrest spread and the VOC began to suspect that the Chinese were going to rebel. Fighting suddenly broke out, and a general massacre of some 10,000 Chinese ensued. A number of Chinese were able to escape the carnage, fleeing eastward along the coast, besieging VOC posts and sometimes massacring their inhabitants. The resistance soon turned into full-scale rebellion as local populations joined the anti-VOC crusade.

Pakubuwana II was now faced with the most difficult decision of his life. His advisors urged him to join the fight against the VOC, while many of the coastal lords thought he should wait until the Dutch were desperate, then come to their rescue at the price of a revision of Javanese-VOC relations. In 1741, spurred on by his patih Natakusuma, the Susuhunan attacked and destroyed the VOC garrison at Kartasura and joined the rebellion. However, faced with the unpleasant prospect of a Mataram victory, the Madurese prince Cakraningrat IV (who had in the meantime been expanding his own power base) turned to an alliance with the VOC and began to systematically conquer the East Javanese lords. VOC reinforcements arrived at Semarang and the tide of war began to turn against the rebels. Pakubuwana II suddenly realized what a terrible blunder he had made, and begged the VOC's forgiveness. In 1742 relations between Mataram and the VOC were re-established. But now the rebels, hemmed in on the northern and eastern fronts and betrayed by their ally, turned against the Susuhunan. In June 1742 rebels marched on Kartasura and overran the kraton. Pakubuwana II fled, appealing to the VOC for help. With the assistance of Cakraningrat IV, the rebels were expelled from Kartasura in December, and the throne was returned to Pakubuwana II. However, the cost to Mataram was high. In 1743 a treaty was signed in which the VOC were given—among other cessions—West Madura, Surabaya, Rembang, Jepara, and the Eastern Salient, as well as part of the annual incomes of other ports. The patih must now swear an oath of

allegiance to both the VOC and the Susuhunan, and there would be a VOC garrison at the court. Searching for a prosperous new beginning, Pakubuwana II began construction on a new kraton at Surakarta on the Sala river. But forces had already been set in motion that would soon spell the end of a unified kingdom.

After Pakubuwana II's return to the throne, the king's brothers Pangéran Singasari and Pangéran Mangkubumi as well as his Mas Said, the Susuhunan's nephew and son of the exiled Pangéran Arya Mangkunegara, had remained at large among the remaining rebels, disillusioned by the Susuhunan's handling of the entire affair. Mangkubumi returned to court in 1744, and in an effort to dislodge the other rebels, the Susuhunan offered an appanage of 3000 households to whoever could bring Mas Said and Pangéran Singasari out of the hills. Mangkubumi accepted the challenge and was successful in driving the rebels out of their stronghold in 1746. However, back at court the patih Pringgalaya, Mangkubumi's arch-enemy, was able to persuade Pakubuwana II to withhold the reward.

Around this time the VOC Governor-General van Imhoff arrived at the Susuhunan's court, requesting possession of the remaining coastal ports. Pakubuwana II was pressed into an agreement without consulting his advisors, convinced by van Imhoff that finally here was a solution to the inability of Mataram to control the coast. Hearing about this foolish move, which deprived Mataram of one of its primary sources of income, Mangkubumi was furious. He was further humiliated when van Imhoff, concerned about Mangkubumi's influence, reprimanded the latter at court for being too ambitious and, like Pringgalaya, convinced the Susuhunan to withhold the promised appanage. Mangkubumi had had enough. In 1746 he left the court and went into open rebellion with Mas Said, plunging Mataram into the Third Javanese War of Succession (1746-57). The two charismatic rebels quickly attracted a large following, and in 1748 they attacked Surakarta, fighting an inconclusive battle.

As the decade came to a close, Pakubuwana II fell ill, and fearing his passing, Baron von Hohendorff was sent from Semarang in 1749 to oversee the succession. Tormented by the instability of his kingdom, the Susuhunan now saw salvation in VOC rule and

entrusted the sovereignty of Mataram to them by treaty on December 11. Pakubuwana II died a short time thereafter. His son succeeded him as Susuhunan Pakubuwana III, but not before Mangkubumi's followers declared him Susuhunan Pakubuwana at his stronghold in Yogya. The December 11 treat remained an unenforceable contract, forgotten until decades later.

In 1750, Mas Said, now Mangkubumi's patih, led a fierce attack on Surakarta and VOC troops, inflicting heavy losses. Surakarta was further demoralized when the crown prince joined the rebels in 1753. However, by this time Mangkubumi was facing internal disputes with the influential Mas Said, whose ambition was perhaps more than Mangkubumi had bargained for. Faced with the increasing possibility that a conclusive victory was unlikely, both sides began to consider alternatives.

In 1754 Governor Hartingh of the Northeast Coast was authorized to offer Mangkubumi a settlement equal to half of the kingdom, with military support against Mas Said. Pakubuwana III was never consulted, but in his weakened position he had no choice but to agree. At the town of Giyanti at the base of Mount Lawu, a treaty was signed by Mangkubumi and Pakubuwana III on 13 February 1755, formalizing the division. The VOC recognized Mangkubumi as Sultan Hamengkubuwana I. A year later, the new Sultan built a court in Yogya and renamed the town Yogyakarta.

However, while Mas Said remained at large there would be no peace. He staged repeated attacks on the VOC and the new Yogya court, but without gaining any definitive ground. In 1756 he began tentative negotiations with the VOC, and after reaching agreements in the next year he swore allegiance to Surakarta, Yogyakarta, and the VOC. From Pakubuwana III he received an appanage of 4000 households; from Hamengkubuwana I he received nothing. Taking the name Pangéran Adipati Mangkunegara I (r. 1757-95) Mas Said settled into his own court within the Surakarta domain.

Large scale warfare was at an end, and Central Java entered into the longest period of peace perhaps since the fall of Majapahit. Agriculture began to flourish after a time, and both the VOC and the Javanese dignitaries began to settle into more peaceable lives.

Strong animosities remained, however, especially between the Sultan and Pangéran Mangkunegara. Hamengkubuwana I had expected Dutch assistance in permanently destroying Mangkunegara, and he felt slighted that the VOC had instead turned to a settlement. There were still prizes to be competed for, however. At the time of the 1755 partition the Susuhunan had several daughters, but no sons. With the succession to the Surakarta throne thus in contention, a complex game of marriage diplomacy was played out, with the aforementioned rivals jockeying to place their sons in advantageous positions relative to the Susuhunan. Although violence nearly erupted on several occasions, relative peace maintained, and the entire game eventually collapsed in 1768 when an heir was born to Pakubuwana III. With successors in both Yogyakarta and Surakarta, the partition of the kingdom assumed a more permanent aura. The division became even more regularized in the years 1771-74, when a new census was taken and a division of territories agreed upon by both major courts, with law codes enacted for settling disputes between subjects of either side.

The final test of division began in the year 1788 with the death of the Susuhunan and the succession of his 19-year-old son as Susuhunan Pakubuwana IV. One of the first moves of the new ruler of Surakarta was to appoint a new group of advisors who encouraged him to believe that Surakarta could take the upper hand in the reunification of Mataram. Rumors began to spread. Yogyakarta worried that the Susuhunan was planning war. Mangkunegara's concern for the security of his fragile fiefdom assumed a new urgency, and he repeatedly petitioned the VOC for independence from the Surakarta kraton. All sides attempted to manipulate the VOC, hoping to achieve a military advantage. With rumors being spread on all sides, the VOC were suddenly shocked to hear that Pakubuwana IV and his advisors were planning a general slaughter of Europeans in Java. They even began to suspect treachery within their own ranks. Hamengkubuwana I and Mangkunegara at last acted together to convince the VOC to intervene militarily. Mangkunegara was relieved of his dependence on Pakubuwana IV and his heirs were assured succession of the now-permanent Mangkunegaran principality.

In 1790 the combined troops of Hamengkubuwana I, Mangkunegara, and the VOC surrounded the Surakarta kraton. Hamengkubuwana I had secretly asked the VOC to allow his son to take the Surakarta throne if the Susuhunan was deposed, but the VOC had already decided to let Mangkunegara have it if events proceeded that far. Pakubuwana IV conceded defeat, however, and surrendered his advisors, who were promptly exiled. The Susuhunan asked for forgiveness and the VOC granted it. A new treaty was drawn up and signed by all four parties, formally recognizing the tripartite division of the kingdom and designating the VOC as overlord and final arbiter of disputes.

Kingship and Succession in the Mataram Era

A major issue arising from the historical context described above concerns the role of the Dutch. For economic reasons the VOC had a vested interest in the stability of Mataram, and they acted to insure that stability by supporting the claims of hereditarily “legitimate” candidates during times of dynastic crisis. Ultimately, however, all attempts to maintain a united kingdom failed. One of the causes for the permanent division of Mataram may have been the inability of the Dutch to comprehend the character of Javanese kingship and dynastic succession.

In Mataram, a king’s rule rested upon his ability to balance legitimacy and local autonomy. Legitimacy refers here to the “magical and religious implementation of kingship” (Moertono 1963:14) and encompasses the concept of Power as described by Anderson (1990).³ Javanese rulers viewed ‘power’ not as a product of social, economic, or political relationships, but as a concrete and finite substance whose quantity remained constant in the Universe; an increase in the concentration of power in one area meant a consequent diffusion of power in another area (Anderson 1990:23). Concentrating and preserving Power thus became a principle objective of the Javanese monarch. Since Power accrued to certain objects or beings, the king filled his palace with glitter and

³In the following discussion I follow Anderson’s convention of capitalizing Javanese “Power” to distinguish it from the contemporary relational model.

finery. Included among these treasures were the *pusaka*—sacred regalia, weapons, and musical instruments—as well as dwarves, astrologers, albinos, and other extraordinary persons (ibid:27; Ricklefs 1974:23).⁴ Power could also manifest in language, such as the way a ruler addressed his subjects in “low” Javanese, while they were obligated to respond in “high” Javanese (Moedjanto 1986:53-101, 124-126; Keeler 1987: chapters 1 and 5). The greatest concentration of Power was thought to lie within the person of the king himself, visible as a *téja* (radiance) emanating softly from his body (Anderson 1990:31).

The core of the Javanese polity was thus a unified center, personified by the supreme ruler (ibid:36). If, as Anderson suggests, this unity was in itself a central symbol of Power, then we can begin to understand the obsessive desire for an undivided kingdom that suffused the political thinking of the Mataram elite prior to the nineteenth century. A loose center indicated a diffusion of Power, and thus, a loss of legitimacy. The centrality of Javanese political thought is further supported by the fact that the words for ‘universe’ or ‘natural world’ occur in the titles of three of the four rulers of post-partition Java: Pakubuwana (“Axis of the Universe”), Hamengkubuwana (“Sustainer of the Universe”), and Pakualam (“Axis of the World”).⁵

However, while the king’s cultural prestige was highly visible, his administrative power was limited. Poor communications and financial difficulties associated with a largely non-monetary economy made it necessary for the king to grant a great deal of autonomy to regional lords (ibid:46). Co-option of the elite was thus a sign of the king’s Power and essential to his rule. If he proved unable to represent their interests, these notables might focus their support elsewhere—although there was always the danger of harsh reprisal. Thus, the absolute power of the king was relatively circumscribed. The Javanese ruler’s traditional role was not to make new policy or solve problems, but

⁴Oral tradition says that a general division of *pusakas* took place at the 1755 Giyanti meeting, as “an accumulation of *pusakas* would have been necessary before the Sultan could firmly establish his court” (Ricklefs 1974:76).

⁵Anderson translates “paku” literally as “nail” which not incorrect, although I feel the usages here justifies and more figurative translation. Note that Mangkunegara, the title taken by Mas Said and his descendants, translates as “to hold the state in ones lap”, or more figuratively as “Protector/Sustainer of the State”.

merely to prevent the emergence of such problems. A great ruler was “a somewhat distant figure who embodied the unity of the realm but for whom it was dangerous to impose too much upon the Central Javanese elite—princes, regional dignitaries, and religious notables—who supported him” (Ricklefs 1974:84).

Ricklefs further emphasizes the importance of consensus, adding that by custom a king should consult with the members of his family and with his advisors, and should take no administrative decision without their agreement” (ibid:23). The *Babad Giyanti* reports that when Pakubuwana II told Mangkubumi of the lease of the *pasisir* to the VOC, Mangkubumi was extremely upset. He returned to his residence and discussed the matter with his own advisors. They were greatly disturbed and saw it as a sign of corruption of the decision-making process in the kingdom that of the nine princes still at court, only Mangkubumi was consulted by the Susuhunan (ibid:43). The *Babad Giyanti* account thus shows that the Susuhunan was not the absolute monarch the Dutch believed him to be. As Mangkubumi is reported to have said in the *Babad Giyanti*, there was no *adat* (cultural precedent) for Pakubuwana II’s behavior—he had no authority to make a major decision such as the surrender of the *pasisir* without consulting the dignitaries of the kingdom (ibid:44). Later, when Mangkubumi was crowned ruler of Mataram in 1749, he emphasized to the VOC that his right to the throne was based upon elite consensus of the dignitaries of the kingdom. Traditional standards said that he should by rights replace the Susuhunan of Surakarta, who is said to have had fewer officials at his accession than when Mangkubumi took the royal titles (ibid:55). By first taking the name Pakubuwana, Mangkubumi positioned himself as direct successor to the previous rulers of Mataram. From an indigenous standpoint, Mangkubumi’s reign thus began in 1749, despite the fact that the Dutch did not recognize his authority until 1755 (ibid:56).

For their part, the Dutch never really tried to understand the Javanese perspective. Their mistake was to believe that the legitimacy of a new ruler was based solely on ancestral links with previous dynasties. While it is true that the new king frequently tried to associate himself through court chronicles (*babads*) with former centers of grandeur, his real claim to legitimacy rested on his successful destruction of the previous center of

Power. By amassing a large following and then crushing the opposing forces, a pretender to the throne showed that he had received the *wahyu* (divine blessing) and was thereby fit to rule (Anderson 1990:39; see also Moedjanto 1986:122-124).

Scholars like Ricklefs and Anderson therefore counter the nationalist view that the 1755 treaty signaled the beginning of a Dutch 'divide and rule' policy. Temporary division of a kingdom during succession struggles had a long historical precedent in Java, and it is clear from events following the Giyanti meeting that neither of the Javanese parties (least of all Mangkubumi) expected the division of the kingdom to be permanent. Since Mangkubumi realized he could not defeat both Mas Said and the VOC-supported Susuhunan, he was prepared to accept a peaceful settlement until such time as he could muster sufficient support to launch a final unifying campaign, as was the traditional strategy (Ricklefs 1974:59, 64). Mangkubumi's main enemy at this time was not the Susuhunan (who commanded very little elite support), but rather the popular and flamboyant Mas Said. If Mas Said did not enjoy such strong support, Mangkubumi would surely have moved against Pakubuwana III and the VOC, for he would have had the near-total backing of the local elite (ibid:63).

Both Ricklefs (1974; 1981) and Legge (1977:82) assert that the most significant role of the Dutch military intervention lay not in instigating the division of the kingdom, but rather in preventing the natural outcome of such division. If this is true, then an important question arises: given the VOC's financial and consequent military weakness in the second half of the 18th century, why did the Javanese rulers not unite against the Dutch, expel them from Java, and subsequently resolve their internal difficulties by fighting to the customary conclusion? While no definitive answer is forthcoming, several reasons are suggested below.

First, it should be remembered that in the eighteenth century there was as yet no sense of cultural conflict between native and foreign peoples that would emerge later in response to more aggressive colonial policies. Up to the nineteenth century, the Dutch were only peripherally involved in the workings of Javanese society. Although there was certainly some Islamic resistance to the Dutch, the Javanese courtly elite generally

viewed them as ‘clowns’, analogous to the *punakawan* in the Javanese shadow theater: amusing, but capricious—to be laughed at, respected, and sometimes even feared. The Dutch were much like any other major commercial power of the day, and to the Javanese their main significance lie in the fact that they were a strong military force whose support could be valuable in times of crisis. (Ricklefs 1974:27-30). Thus, the Dutch position was generally not that of an oppressive external force singularly opposing Javanese interests. Since for most Javanese rulers the focus of conflict was primarily with their immediate neighbors, the advantages of a united anti-European campaign may never have received serious consideration.

Cooperation between rulers also faced considerable barriers in the highly stratified Javanese social world. At the time of the Giyanti meeting in 1755 there was no *adat* for two rulers of equal status to greet each other. In meetings between the Sultan and the Susuhunan the potential for extreme embarrassment always existed, since neither king could subordinate himself to the other. In the 19th century certain protocols developed to make such meetings less awkward, with the Susuhunan of Surakarta eventually assuming a somewhat higher position than the Sultan of Yogyakarta (ibid:77-78). But in 1755, how could the Sultan and the Susuhunan ever stand together as joint commanders against the Dutch?

After partition, many Javanese dignitaries may have come to believe that their best interests lay with the new political structure. After a century of crisis, they may have simply lost the desire to resolve the anomalous situation through warfare. The philosophical dilemma of internal disunity may have lost most of its sting, with efforts turning instead to preserving the peace. Indeed, after partition Central Java saw an unparalleled seventy years without major warfare. Rather than dealing with the problems that prevented the expulsion of the VOC, the two *kratons* took refuge in traditional ideas that explained the irregular situation but did nothing to change it (ibid:219, 417-421). This is the topic of the final section below.

Legitimation in Post-Partition Java

To establish his rule, Hamengkubuwana I elaborated upon his visible status. The new *kraton* and the accumulation of *pusakas* has already been mentioned. A VOC provision of trumpeters, elephants, Persian horses, and a coach further augmented his “celestial grandeur” (Moedjanto 1986). He was a grand builder, and was responsible for the construction of *Taman Sari*, a beautiful complex of artificial lakes, underwater tunnels and false islands. Several Javanese texts of the time (*Babad Kraton* and *Serat Surya Raja*) suggest that *Taman Sari* was more than a pleasure garden; it provided a symbolic link with the Goddess of the Southern Ocean, the mystical confident of the Mataram kingdom since the days of its first rulers, Senapati and Sultan Agung (Ricklefs 1974:84-87).

Yet despite these traditional affirmations of royal power, it is evident from the above discussion that the division of Mataram in 1755 and the increasing solidity of that partition put considerable strain on contemporary notions of legitimacy. The spread of Islam with its sharp separation between God and man had not greatly diminished the traditional view that the Javanese monarch was ‘God’s shadow upon the earth’.⁶ A unified monarchy was the ideal, and breaks in that unity were viewed as temporary anomalies to be resolved with the ascendancy of the one great king. Yet in the second half of the 18th century the Javanese elite was increasingly confronted with the possibility of a permanently divided polity. Could traditional views of kingship be revised to allow for the possibility of more than one legitimate ruler? The new Sultanate of Yogyakarta was in a particularly awkward position since it did not stand within the direct line of rulers that led from Plered to Surakarta. The turning of an age-old political theory would provide the impetus for a literary response to this dilemma.

In accordance with the Javanese view of the cyclic concentration and diffusion of Power (Anderson 1990:33-34) Javanese court chronicles predicted the rise and fall of kingdoms in rigid hundred-year intervals: ninety-seven years of rule followed by an intermediary period of three years before the establishment of a new *kraton*. The theory

⁶See Anderson 1990:67-72 for a more detailed discussion of the influence of Islam on Javanese cosmology.

may have been devised from the observed pattern of the fall of Plered and the rise of Kartasura, but there is evidence to suggest that it was already extant and may even have influenced the outcome of these events (Ricklefs 1981:97).

The pattern was supposedly traceable to the fall of Majapahit in the Javanese year S 1400 (AD 1478). Majapahit was succeeded by Demak in S 1403 (AD 1481), which in turn was said to have fallen in S 1500 (AD 1578). Next in the line of succession was Pajang and Mataram, seen as a single stage in this scheme lasting from S 1503 (AD 1581) to the siege of Plered by Trunajaya in AJ 1600 (AD 1677). Three years later, in AJ 1603 (AD 1680) Amangkurat II established the Surakarta *kraton*. Thus, as the year AJ 1700 (AD 1774) approached, the rulers of Yogyakarta and Surakarta must have been especially concerned. The theory predicted that Mataram would again be unified, but that the cost would be the destruction of the other centers of Power. Apprehension at the approach of this fateful year may have prompted the land settlements and law code of 1771-74 which enhanced the stability of both courts (Ricklefs 1981:97).

At the beginning of the Javanese year 1700 in March 1774, the crown prince of Yogyakarta wrote a book entitled *Serat Surya Raja* ("The Book of the Sun of Kings"), later to become one of the pusaka of the Sultanate. In thinly disguised allegorical form this massive work told of the reunification of Mataram and the conversion of the Dutch to Islam, with the Goddess of the Southern Ocean and eventually God himself coming to the aid of the protagonist, none other than the crown prince himself. Although a military resolution to Mataram's crisis was unfeasible given the current political climate, the *Serat Surya Raja* may have represented a literary solution to the problem (Ricklefs 1974:186-212). At this time, the Sultan apparently considered abdicating in favor of his son, the idea being to produce a new ruler, if not a new court. However, in the face of VOC reluctance to recognize the crown prince as his heir, Hamengkubuwana I remained on the throne (Ricklefs 1981:97).

In AJ 1703 (AD 1777), at the time a new court should have been founded, Radèn Tumenggung Djajengrat, a son-in-law of the Sultan, wrote what has come to be called the *Babad Kraton* ("Chronicle of the Court"). Whereas the *Serat Surya Raja* had looked

forward in time, the *Babad Kraton* looked back at events of the last several hundred years. In essence, this work depicted Yogyakarta as the direct successor to Kartasura, the court which, according to Javanese theory, should have fallen in AJ 1700 (AD 1774). Djajengrat concluded his narrative with the fall of the Kartasura kraton in AD 1742, thus implying the end of an era—no matter that this end should actually have occurred several decades later. By leaving out the subsequent foundation of Surakarta and Mangkubumi's rebellion it might then appear to the Javanese elite that Yogyakarta was indeed the legitimate successor to Kartasura. It was a contrived picture of the past, but one which avoided the potentially violent implications of the turn of the new century (Ricklefs 1974:212-218; 1981:97-98).

With each of the two major courts unwilling to risk everything in a new war to defend its prestige, Yogyakarta and Surakarta began to place even more emphasis than before on the external forms of royal glory, such as state ceremonials, language, music, and dance performance (see Moedjanto 1986 and Sudarsono 1984). Administrative agreements such as those of 1771-74 further solidified the partition by preventing courtiers from shifting allegiances from one ruler to another; all three rulers agreed that it was in their mutual interests to return refugees to their court of origin. A dissatisfied member of the elite could therefore neither seek another patron, nor could he gather the strength to rebel (Ricklefs 1974:422).

Although the Javanese court elite were eventually able to legitimize the permanent division of the kingdom, their theory was unable to resolve the inherent tension in the existence of two separate but powerful courts within the same 70 km radius. The fact that *adat* could not resolve the problems of protocol and regal glory to allow the meeting and cooperation of two equal sovereigns has already been mentioned. Only by ignoring each other could each ruler be legitimate, each possess the true set of *pusaka*, and each receive the blessing of the Goddess of the Southern Sea.

Conclusion

This paper has traced the events surrounding the division of the last great Javanese kingdom in the middle of the eighteenth century. It has also attempted to provide insight into several key issues, including the nature of Javanese kingship and the position of the Dutch relative to the lords of Mataram. It has been shown that while the Dutch saw hereditary descent as a primary legitimizing factor, Javanese placed greater emphasis on Power and the elite consensus that a man of Power was able to command. An overriding concern with the centralization of Power and the largely peripheral status of the Dutch in relation to events in Mataram has been posited as the reason the Javanese were unable to form a united front against VOC incursions. Finally, the paper has addressed the problems caused by the simultaneous existence of two powerful courts in post-partition Java. As the turn of the Javanese century approached (with all its prophetic implications) the Yogyakarta *kraton* elite tried to reconcile political theory and political fact in a series of pseudo-historical literary works meant to boost the position of the Sultan in the eyes of his followers. While the desired effect may have been achieved, it was not at the expense of royal ideology: each ruler had to deny the other's existence. As the possibility of successful military action faded, rulers found other ways to compete for the title of "God's shadow upon the earth." The people of the once-mighty kingdom of Mataram settled into a long period of relative peace and stability, finding in division what had eluded them in unity.

A Chronology of Javanese History From the Fall of Majapahit to the Late Mataram Period

S 1400	/ AD 1478	Supposed fall of Majapahit
S 1403	/ AD 1481?	Supposed foundation of Demak
	AD 1505?-1546?	“Golden Age”, Demak ruled by Sultan Trenggana
	AD 1527	Kediri, the last Hindu-Buddhist state, falls to Demak
S 1500	/ AD 1578?	Supposed fall of Demak
S 1503	/ AD 1581	Supposed foundation of Pajang by Jaka Tingkir
	AD 1584?	Panembahan Senapati Ingalaga, first ruler of Mataram (r. 1584?-1601)
	AD 1587-88?	Defeat of Pajang
	AD 1601	Ascension of Panembahan Séda ing Krapyak, second ruler of Mataram (r. 1601-13)
	AD 1613	Death of Panembahan Krapyak and ascension of his son (Sultan) Agung (r. 1613-45)
	AD 1624	Conquest of Madura; Agung takes the title Susuhunan
	AD 1625	Conquest of Surabaya
	AD 1628-29	Failed sieges of Batavia
	AD 1633	Adoption of Islamic lunar calendar
	AD 1636	Defeat of Sunan Giri
	AD 1637	Crown Prince (later Amangkurat I) implicated in scandal involving wife of senior court official
	AD 1641	Title of Sultan solicited from Mecca
	AD 1645	Death of Sultan Agung and ascension of his son Amangkurat I (r. 1646-77)
	AD 1647	Amangkurat I orders the massacre of his brother and the Islamic leadership (5000-6000 people) in an attempt to cover up the events of 1637.
	AD 1659	Amangkurat I murders his father-in-law, Pangéran Pekik of Surabaya, along with his family
	AD 1660s	Rumors of severe tensions between Amangkurat I and the Crown Prince
	AD 1670?	Crown Prince introduced to Radèn Trunajaya, a disaffected prince of Madura; together they conspire against Amangkurat I
	AD 1675	Rebellion breaks out; Trunajaya, victorious in the north, begins advancing on the court at Plered
AJ 1600	/ AD 1677	Amangkurat I requests VOC aid; Trunajaya attacks Plered; Amangkurat I and the Crown Prince flee, leaving Pangéran Puger to recoup the throne when Trunajaya withdraws to Kediri; Amangkurat I dies and the VOC recognizes the Crown Prince as Amangkurat II (r. 1677-1703)
	AD 1678-79	Kediri destroyed by VOC; Trunajaya captured and personally stabbed to death by Amangkurat II
AJ 1603	/ AD 1680	Amangkurat II establishes Kartasura kraton
	AD 1681	Pangéran Puger defeated with VOC aid; he returns to court

AD 1684	Massacre of VOC Captain François Tack and his men by Amangkurat II and Surapati, a Balinese rebel being sheltered at the kraton
AD 1703	Death of Amangkurat II and ascension of his son Amangkurat III; Pangéran Puger flees to Semarang and convinces the VOC of his friendship and legitimacy
AD 1704	VOC recognize Pangéran Puger as Pakubuwana I (r. 1704-19); First Javanese War of Succession begins (1704-08)
AD 1705	Kartasura falls; Amangkurat III exiled to Ceylon; Pakubuwana I makes major concessions to the VOC in return for cancellation of Mataram's accumulated debt
AD 1717	Surabaya rebels, other areas in the northeast soon follow
AD 1719	Death of Pakubuwana I and ascension of his son Amangkurat IV (r. 1719-26); Second Javanese War of Succession begins (1719-23); revolts are put down with VOC aid
AD 1726	Death of Amangkurat IV and ascension of his son Pakubuwana II (r. 1726-49)
AD 1732	Pakubuwana II exiles the anti-VOC patih Danuréja, negotiates new treaty with VOC for repayment of war debts
AD 1738	Cakraningrat IV of Madura resists Mataram vassalage
AD 1740	Chinese War (1740-45); massacre of Chinese in Batavia and their subsequent rebellion; Pakubuwana II joins anti-VOC forces; VOC and Cakraningrat IV forge alliance, turning the tide of battle against Pakubuwana II and the rebels
AD 1742	Pakubuwana II, realizing his mistake, begs the VOC for forgiveness; the rebels turn on Pakubuwana II and take Kartasura; Pakubuwana II appeals to the VOC; with the help of Cakraningrat IV he is restored to power; several key figure remain in rebellion, including Pangéran Singasari, Pangéran Mangkubumi, and Mas Said
AD 1743	Surakarta kraton founded by Pakubuwana II
AD 1744	Mangkubumi returns to court
AD 1746	Pakubuwana II offers an appanage of 3000 households to whoever can expel the rebels from their stronghold in the hills above Surakarta; Mangkubumi accepts the challenge and is successful; the appanage is withheld; Pakubuwana II cedes the VOC the pasisir; disgusted and humiliated, Mangkubumi rebels
AD 1749	Cession of Mataram to VOC; Mangkubumi crowned Sultan Pakubuwana (later Hamengkubuwana I) at his stronghold in Yogya; death of Pakubuwana II and ascension of his son Pakubuwana III
AD 1755	Treaty of Giyanti, dividing the kingdom between Pakubuwana III and Hamengkubuwana I
AD 1756	Yogyakarta kraton founded by Hamengkubuwana I
AD 1757	Mas Said assumes the title Pangéran Adipati Mangkunegara (r. 1757-95)
AD 1768	Heir born to Pakubuwana III
AD 1771-74	Land settlements and law codes
AJ 1700 / AD 1774	Composition of Serat Surya Raja
AJ 1703 / AD 1777	Composition of Babad Kraton
AD 1784	Succession of Pakubuwana IV (r. 1788-1820)
AD 1790	Treaty formalizing tripartite division of kingdom
AD 1792	Death of Hamengkubuwana I

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